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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Some professional soldiers and military experts believe that technology can enable armed forces to avoid direct combat. These enthusiasts think that sophisticated precision weaponry will enable forces to control warfare from a distance. A few military thinkers extend this belief to urban operations. As the U.S. prepares for a possible war with Iraq, the media has given voice to those who feel that U.S. technological advantages will avoid casualties in cities. One adherent to the school of thought that U.S. forces may be able to avoid the difficulties of urban combat in Baghdad is COL(R) David Hackworth. He said in a media interview, "all we have to do is encircle the cities that he has dug in on and shut off the electricity, shut off the lights and then hit him with non-lethal weapons . . . and the end result will be we'll win without having a lot of bloodshed." 1 Hackworth's comments outline an attractive course of actio n, one that parallels the Indirect Approach that MG(R) Robert H. Scales, Jr., suggests. MG(R) Scales believes that the U.S. could use an approach similar to Hackworth's to defeat military forces in enemy cities.
Scales described his method in an article titled "The Indirect Approach: How US Military
Forces Can Avoid the Pitfalls of Future Urban Warfare," published in the October 1998 issue of the Armed Forces Journal International. 2 The article in essence argues that it is possible to achieve success in urban operations without sending ground troops into the city. The course of action is initially very appealing to the public, civilian leadership, and military planners intent on avoiding losing large numbers of troops in urban combat. While the Indirect Approach works soundly when applied to a hypothetical situation, it is not clear that the U.S. can apply the approach in the real world. To assess the Indirect Approach realistically it is necessary to choose a scenario and then do a course of action assessment; that is, develop a military estimate.
1 David Hackworth, "Interview with Colonel David Hackworth," (Fox & Friends Fox News Channel, 27 August 2002) . MG(R) Scales' proposal has three parts: isolate the city while seizing control of the infrastructure and public services, take advantage of time, which would now be on the side of U.S. forces, and wait for the city to implode. 3 The proposal is sufficiently detailed that a military estimate of the requirements is possible. Similarly, military intelligence estimates are available to support analysis of the effects of the investment and its effects on the population. However, before Baghdad can be isolated, it is necessary to get from the border to Baghdad. Hence, a campaign needs to be designed.
Assessing the campaign before an investment of Baghdad required an analysis of the likely enemy courses of action in response to a variety of U.S. courses of action. The intent was to identify what effect different courses of action would have on an investment. The campaign design was informed by MG(R) Scales' other writings to the extent possible. That was necessary to avoid creating impossible conditions for his concept. Despite the care taken to remain faithful to MG(R) Scales, it was also necessary to apply military judgement to fill in the campaign elements needed to meet the requirements of joint doctrine. The items MG(R) Scales did not address were then analyzed to determine both their relevance and importance.
After the course of action was developed and assessed it was clear that the Indirect Approach is not a feasible course of action for a U.S. attack on Baghdad. Although the U.S. can invest Baghdad, a long siege does not work to the benefit of either U.S. military forces or U.S.
policy. U.S. forces cannot depend on the Iraqi people to overthrow their own government. A siege will foster unnecessary ill will among the Iraqi and Arab people, thereby making it difficult for the U.S. to win the peace. A humanitarian crisis will divert resources and focus international pressure on ending the siege. Finally, the course of action will allow Iraqi political and military forces to find sanctuary from U.S. forces.
However, a feasible course of action for regime change in Baghdad that incorporates some of MG Scales' ideas is possible. That course of action makes use of close combat when necessary to strike or control key targets in the city. It avoids unnecessary damage to the infrastructure and unnecessary suffering among the Iraqi civilians. Most importantly, it minimizes the time that it takes to gain control of Baghdad and Iraq.
CHAPTER TWO: THE INDIRECT APPROACH
Urban operations are very difficult. The characteristics of a city have a large effect on military operations. Due to those effects, military forces that have a large advantage in open terrain may lose those advantages in urban terrain. The difficulties presented to an attacker can make an urban battle protracted and deadly. A method of describing the characteristics of cities is to use the urban triad: physical terrain, population, and infrastructure. 4 The physical terrain of a city is extremely complex. The ground usually has topographical features such as hills, depressions, spurs, saddles, and draws. A city usually contains significant water barriers. Many cities lie along rivers because the rivers provide power, water, and transportation. The ocean also blocks at least one side of any seaport. A city has manmade structures that are both above and below the ground. Many of the structures are more than one story tall and connect together. There are underground tunnels such as sewers and subway systems, as well as above ground throughways such as highways and roads. The infrastructure of a city is a system of systems that includes highways, mass transit, water and wastewater treatment, garbage disposal, power, police, and medical services. Ideally, the infrastructure of a city enables the population to move around the city with relative ease and to live under relatively good health conditions. However, if some of the systems are missing or in poor repair, a city can quickly become an unhealthy environment. The infrastructure is, in effect, the life support system of a city.
Military operations will affect the city's infrastructure, and as a result, further affect the population. porous ring would allow civilians to flee the city center, where Saddam's soldiers--and perhaps the Iraqi leader himself--would be holed up, anxiously waiting for a "mother of all battles" that would never materialize. "You can be patient, with a minimum loss of life," says Scales, "or you can rush in and kill a lot of people on both sides."
Baghdad would seem particularly vulnerable to such a wait-it-out strategy. It is not even close to being self-sufficient. If U.S. troops cut off the supply of water, food, electricity and communications, civilians would no doubt quickly begin fleeing to the safety of refugee camps set up outside the cordon. The U.S. military could wait for the white flag of surrender to flutter outside the range of most of Saddam's weapons. Armed with intelligence gleaned from fleeing refugees, the Americans could attack key targets inside the city with long-range weapons. Such a siege could help nurture one prized U.S. goal: Saddam's falling at the hands of his own people. "Baghdad is one of those classic cities that happen to contain all the kindling necessary to spark a revolt," says Scales. "You'd have the ruling elite and the army cheek by jowl with the people, who despise both the elite and the army." 14 Scales' comments to Time reveal that he believed the Indirect Approach could work in Baghdad.
He made it clear that he believed the U.S. currently has the capabilities to apply the Indirect Approach.
MG(R) Scales' proposal has "three fundamental concepts: using an Indirect Approach, using time to our advantage, and letting the city collapse on itself."
15 Instead of approaching enemy forces in the city directly, Scales argues that forces should take an Indirect Approach.
The Indirect Approach to reducing cities requires the complete isolation of the city and the control of infrastructure and public services. U.S. forces control every avenue of approach.
They also "control sources of food, power, water, and sanitation services." 16 Additionally, U.S.
forces seize control of all internal communications and stifle "commercial, financial and governmental nodes." 17 U.S. forces, therefore, provide the only information available to the residents. U.S. forces will hit only key pieces of terrain. Unmanned aerial vehicles provide reconnaissance. U.S. forces avoid close combat and instead hit targets from a large distance, staying safely out of range of the enemy.
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The second concept in Scales' proposal is taking advantage of time. Using information operations, U.S. forces seek to convince the city's population that the enemy army is a "hostile occupying force." 19 A key element of the strategy is that time is on the side of U.S. forces. In order to avoid a greater amount of bloodshed, U.S. forces patiently wait for the Indirect Approach to work. In time, the population turns against the enemy forces.
The third concept is the city's collapse. U.S. forces will encourage other organizations to establish sanctuaries and refugee camps for the citizens who flee the city. Coalition forces encourage the population to pass through the cordon to the camps. People who do not depart the city become rapidly displeased with the government.
In short, urban operations are extremely complicated and challenging. Any approach which avoids direct combat in urban operations is extremely appealing. MG Scales' Indirect Approach seeks to take a city while avoiding urban combat. This monograph shows the results from the application of a military estimate of how the method would work in Baghdad. The results are laid out in the order that they would occur during a campaign. The Iraqi regime depends upon its security forces to ensure the support of the population and the safety of Saddam Hussein. Consequently, severing the link between the dictator and the security forces can undermine the regime. Either killing or seizing the Baath Party leadership or at least its communications with the security system can accomplish that. To achieve the strategic end state, U.S. forces will have to attain control of Baghdad. Baghdad is the center of Iraq's political, economic, and cultural institutions. For a new regime to gain legitimacy, it must control the city.
CHAPTER THREE: THE CAMPAIGN
To secure Baghdad there are four basic options. The first option is similar to the strategy the United States employed in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the United States used air power in support of indigenous Afghan forces to defeat the Taliban. In Iraq, the U.S. strategy could be that of a bombing campaign in conjunction with a ground war fought by indigenous forces made up of Kurdish forces and/or turned Iraqi units. The second option is a relatively small U.S. ground force of fewer than 100,000 troops, which isolates Baghdad in much the same manner as Scales describes. The third U.S. option is that of a much larger ground force, perhaps numbering 250,000 troops 21 , which goes into Baghdad and engages in ground combat to sweep the city. A fourth and final option is to attempt to change the regime in Iraq through airpower only. The U.S.
may combine different elements from each of these strategies to create another option. 22 For the purpose of this case study, this analysis will combine the second and third options. The U.S. will incorporate the Indirect Approach into a plan that isolates and lays siege to Baghdad with an overall force of 200,000 troops inside Iraq.
Of course, Iraq will also set its objectives and create its plan. Saddam Hussein desires to remain in power as the leader of the current Iraqi government, and to have the potential to achieve regional hegemony over his Arab neighbors. To reach that end state, he must achieve three conditions. First, he must stay in power. Second, his security apparatus must stay loyal and remain in place. The security apparatus is what enables Hussein to keep control over the people of Iraq. Third, he must be able to continue clandestinely creating WMD. Development of a nuclear weapon would better enable Iraq to deter the U.S and to assert control over neighboring nations. The three conditions listed above are already in place in Iraq. Therefore, Hussein simply needs to maintain the status quo to reach his objectives.
Iraq will focus on three U.S. critical vulnerabilities to maintain the status quo and keep the U.S. from winning the conflict. First, he will seek to undermine the coalition. By dissolving the coalition, Saddam would deny the U.S. the use of vital ports, air bases, and terrain in neighboring countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and Kuwait. The second of these is international public opinion. If Hussein can influence international public opinion, he will be able to exert pressure on the U.S. to negotiate an end to the conflict. The third critical vulnerability is U.S. domestic opinion. By influencing the U.S. public, Hussein can erode support for the administration and affect the conduct of the war. To strike these critical vulnerabilities,
Saddam will entrench himself and his loyal supporters in Baghdad, while he fights his own information campaign against the U.S.
Intelligence data indicates that Saddam Hussein plans to make the U.S. fight in the cities.
"There are some indications that they are going to dig themselves in in population centers," 23 said 
ISR
At this point in the campaign, those advocating the Indirect Approach try to set certain conditions to avoid direct combat. The U.S. will try to strike important targets such as weapons of mass destruction and the leadership of Iraq's regime and armed forces. The Indirect Approach uses intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to find targets from a safe distance. ISR is important to the Indirect Approach because it is the key to the indirect destruction of the enemy. To the extent ISR fails, the forces must attack the remaining targets directly. "High-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles orbiting miles above the city could maintain unlimited surveillance with a minimum of manpower. Ground-mounted cameras could observe areas susceptible to infiltration." 28 There are serious issues that prevent these tools from providing unlimited surveillance. At Operation ANACONDA in March 2002, an intensive pre-battle reconnaissance effort focused every available surveillance and target acquisition system on a tiny, ten-by-ten kilometer battlefield. Yet fewer than 50 percent of all the al Qaeda positions ultimately identified in the course of the fighting on this battlefield were discovered prior to contact. In fact, most fire received by U.S. forces in ANACONDA came from initially unseen, unanticipated al Qaeda fighting positions.
How could such things happen in an era of persistent reconnaissance drones, airborne radars, satellite surveillance, thermal imaging and hypersensitive electronic eavesdropping equipment? The answer is that the earth's surface remains an extremely complex environment with an abundance of natural and manmade cover for those militaries capable of exploiting it.
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Just as there were limitations to ISR asset capabilities in mountain operations, there will be limitations on ISR effectiveness in Baghdad. Specifically, there are three major factors lim iting ISR.
The first limiting factor is weather, a serious impediment to the use of anything that is flying for surveillance. Not only can poor weather stop aircraft from flying, it also limits the capability of ISR instruments in the aircraft. The second factor is the urban terrain itself.
Overhead cover easily blocks aerial surveillance systems. Urban terrain makes it relatively simple to hide or camouflage weapons of mass destruction. An adept enemy can easily use a network of sewers and a series of holes cut through shared walls to maneuver unobserved.
Finally, the large number of civilians in the city will make it very difficult for sensors to pick out the correct leadership targets within the city. Presently, the U.S cannot count on technology to conduct unlimited surveillance of the enemy. As a result, in the Indirect Approach, ISR sensors will often have a difficult time finding the correct target.
Scales suggests that fleeing refugees will provide target intelligence to the U.S. Since the Indirect Approach does not provide a way for U.S. forces to engage the enemy with troops on the ground, the Iraqi regime can survive precision targeting form the air, all the while using information operations to weaken the political will of the U.S. and the cohesion of the coalition.
Isolating the City
Besides conducting ISR during the approach phase, the Indirect Approach requires the isolation of Baghdad. In order to isolate Baghdad, the U.S. must be able to control the movement of military and civilian traffic by air, sea, and land. The U.S. should easily be able to stop movement of Iraqi air assets in and out of Baghdad. Currently the U.S., in conjunction with Great Britain, is enforcing no fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. Establishing another no fly zone around Baghdad will not be difficult. Blocking the navigable channels in and out of Baghdad will also be relatively easy. Shallow draft boats can navigate sections of the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers. 37 U.S. Coast Guard or U.S. Navy vessels will patrol the river to ensure only approved traffic goes in and out of Baghdad. The most challenging aspect of isolating Baghdad will be controlling land access to and from the city. U.S. forces can only achieve this efficiently by employing ground forces. These ground forces will be vulnerable to Iraqi direct fire and indirect fire weapons hidden in the city and its suburbs. Retaliating against enemy fire is difficult because the Indirect Approach seeks to avoid combat in the city between ground forces. Retaliating in the city and its suburbs with long range and indirect fire weapons means a high risk of civilian casualties. For example, enemy mortars can fire at the cordon from sites near hospitals or mosques, then quickly displace before the U.S.'s answering rounds arrive. The Iraqi government could then publicize the resulting collateral damage. Any effort to isolate Baghdad will encounter this problem but the Indirect Approach exacerbates the problem because it relies on taking as much time as necessary for the city to collapse. As time passes, the cordon stays vulnerable to enemy fire. Therefore, the isolation of Baghdad is possible. However, it is not a risk-free endeavor. Thus, during the approach to Baghdad the Indirect Approach increases the vulnerability of the attacking force to enemy fires and places reliance on ISR to permit precise attacks on the targets within the city.
These two conditions may create the political environment Baghdad seeks, namely, an extended attack on the city with the regime still intact.
Once Baghdad has been isolated, regardless of the plan, a decisive phase must ensure to bring about the collapse or destruction of the regime. During this phase, the Indirect Approach calls for U.S. forces to control the city's infrastructure. The course of action uses control, combined with information operations, to cause the people to revolt against the government. U.S forces encourage refugees either to leave the city for camps or to move to areas in the city that will provide them with sanctuary. Humanitarian organizations will then take care of the refugees.
According to the Indirect Approach, time is now to the advantage of the U.S.
Infrastructure and Public Services
Controlling the city's infrastructure depends on two factors. First, the infrastructure must be an important element of the city's life. Second, the U.S. must have the capability to control those systems.
Perhaps the most important service in Baghdad is electrical power. This is because so many other services rely on power to function properly. because the damage will be costly to restore. Another sanitation service, garbage disposal, is more difficult for U.S. forces to control. However, sanitation services are already very poor.
The state of garbage collection and disposal services in Baghdad is atrocious. The numbers of garbage trucks in Baghdad have declined from 800 in1990 to 480 in 2000. The result is that two-thirds of the garbage that Baghdad produces now accumulates between the residences of Baghdad. An interruption of garbage disposal will only increase the pace that garbage is accumulating by 33%.
It will also be difficult for U.S. forces to control garbage removal. The system has no central nodes to target. Bombing a landfill may disperse its contents, but it does not eliminate its use as a dumpsite. However, the disposal system is in such a poor state, there really is not much of a need or benefit to controlling it.
Another system that is very difficult to control is the media. There is a great deal of debate about whether U.S. forces can and should control the media during urban operations. Like Scales, Dov Tamari, a retired brigadier general who served in the Israeli Defense Forces during the Lebanon Campaign, believes that forces involved in urban operations should control the media. He writes, "Internal and external isolation are very beneficial, and only carefully selected 48 Ibid., 8. 49 Ibid., 9.
information should be released for publication." 50 Tamari suggested modeling a media campaign after the method the U.S. used during Desert Storm. However, during Desert Storm, U.S. forces were unable to control the international media in Baghdad. Nor did the bombing of Baghdad completely drive away the media.
"Controlling both news representatives and their information is complicated by the nature of city environments." 51 With the most intriguing story in the world unfolding in Baghdad, it will be close to impossible to keep the media out. Enterprising journalists will find ways to embed themselves in the city, and, if necessary, will be equally creative in smuggling their stories out through refugees or humanitarian and non-governmental organizations. The media will most likely be impossible to control.
A new weapon that the U.S. may use for the first time in Iraq is the microwave bomb.
These bombs are capable of destroying computers without causing other collateral damage.
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However, according to the editor of Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, Rob Hewson, the weapon will have little control, rather, "it would be indiscriminate, not just turning off electricity for Iraq's radar stations, but also affecting power to hospitals and schools." 53 The only degree of control the weapon offers is that it may allow the U.S. to take out some parts of the infrastructure, such as wastewater treatment plants, without physically destroying the structure of the plants. opposed to 3000 calories before Desert Storm. 54 The government of Iraq rations UN provided food, but by no means does every citizen get an equal share. 55 In fact, the "regime has also been accused of manipulating food rationing to bolster its position" 56 over the population. In a recent report, the United Nations wrote, the "Iraqi regime has been able to tighten its grip on the people through a system of rationing and indirectly through the oil-for-food programme, enabling the central authorities to reward loyalty and punish dissent." 57 If U.S. forces cut off the food supplies to Baghdad, canned and preserved foods stockpiled in Baghdad are likely to go to the elite and the security forces, while the great majority of civilians starve.
Denying food to the Iraqi people will be relatively easy for the U.S. The vast majority of Iraq's food now comes from the UN oil-for-food program. Turning off or redirecting the supply will be easy when the U.S. controls the approaches to Baghdad. However, denying food is not the same thing as controlling it. The U.S. will not be able to determine which of Baghdad's citizens eat and which do not. Iraq's security forces will be in a much better position to accomplish that.
The issue of control and denial applies not just to food, but also to all of the infrastructure and service systems discussed above. U.S. forces will not be able to control infrastructure and public services in Baghdad, but they will be able to destroy infrastructure and deny those services for some duration. The term control implies that U.S. forces could use technological means to turn utilities and services on and off at will. Clearly, that degree of control was not available 54 Janes, "Natural Resources," Iraq; available from http://www4.janes.com; Internet; accessed 2 December 2002.. 55 Ibid. 56 Janes, "External Affairs," Iraq; available from http://www4.janes.com; Internet; accessed 2 December 2002. during Desert Storm. Desert Storm's results showed that the coalition was easily able to take out infrastructure and public services.
The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) stated immediately after the ceasefire that Baghdad 'is a city essentially unmarked, a body with its skin basically intact, with every main bone broken and with its joints and tendons cut….' There was little rubble, and civilians were spared, but their life support systems-electricity, water, transportation, communications-were disabled. 58 However, there is little evidence that coalition forces were able to control these services and utilities to any degree beyond turning them off. Technological advances since Desert Storm has done little to advance that control, with some exceptions, such as inducing temporary electrical outages without causing permanent damage.
Control is the wrong term for the power U.S. forces will have over Baghdad's utilities and services. Deny is a better word. U.S. forces will only be showing that they have shut down Baghdad, not that they control Baghdad. The distinction is important, for the population will not see the U.S. as in control of their life support systems; instead, the population will only see that no one is in control of those systems.
The denial of public services and infrastructure will not have a large effect on the survival of the Baath Party elite and the security forces in Baghdad. Instead, it will further degrade the miserable conditions that the rest of the population endures. Almost one-third of the population "lives in slums and squatter settlements." 59 Currently there "is a serious shortage of fresh water and some urban areas are ankle deep in raw sewage. Food is scarce and many Iraqis are struggling to survive." 60 The specific data on the power, food, water, and sanitation services reveals that the majority of the population of the city will endure the worst of the service 58 William M. Arkin, "Baghdad, The Urban Sanctuary in Desert Storm?" Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 1997, 3. 59 Janes, "Demographics," Iraq; available from http://www4.janes.com; Internet; accessed 2 December 2002. 60 Ibid.
interruptions, while the elite will live off the resources that they have husbanded and that remain available.
After considering the prospects for controlling the infrastructure of Baghdad, two conclusions stand out. First, the services are currently so poor that the effects on the populace and their support for the regime are likely to be minimal in military terms. The increased suffering, however, may improve the regime's international political efforts. Second, the United States can gain control of the major urban service, electrical distribution, but controlling any or all of the other services does not seem significant. Thus, the first assumption of the Indirect Approach, namely that civilian hardship will lead to discontent, seems questionable.
The Indirect Approach calls for control of the infrastructure, combined with information operations, to cause the population to overthrow the government. Two parts of that premise warrant further examination. The first is the capability of information operations to foment a revolution. The second is whether the population is capable of overthrowing the government.
Information Operations
The United States and Iraq are already using information operations to influence the Iraqi people. For example, Radio Sawa, a U.S. radio station that broadcasts over the radios of the Iraqi people, featured a message "from the Pentagon's No. 3 official urging Iraqis to rise up against the dictator." 61 In Scales' proposed course of action, U.S. forces will use leaflet drops and other methods to send the same message to the population of Baghdad. The challenge that the U.S. will face is convincing the very population that the U.S. is laying siege to that foreign control, however temporary, will be a better alternative than the current Iraqi regime.
"'Baghdad is one of those cities that happen to contain all the kindling necessary to spark a revolt" says Scales. Saddam has "perfected the art of personal survival."
71 There were reports that an element of the Republican Guard attempted a coup in 1992, but that Special Republican Guard units and security forces in Baghdad stopped it almost immediately. 72 It is unlikely, "based on Saddam's past survival, improved ability to buy support and pay off elites, and decade-long experience in purging its enemies," that an internal Iraqi coup will be successful in Baghdad. 73 Historically, hurting the population of a nation does not endanger that nation's government. Instead, it tends to cause resentment and resistance against the attacker. "Punishment does produce emotional stress, but this reduces rather than increases collective action against the government, because heavy punishment induces a "survival" response and light punishment, a "Pearl Harbor" effect."
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Even if the population made the effort to revolt, it is unlikely that a true revolution will occur in Baghdad. For regime change to take place, someone who is not in Saddam's inner circle will have to take over the country. Otherwise, the resulting Iraqi regime will probably look a lot like the previous regime. In addition, the forces that Saddam has assigned to defend Baghdad are the ones that are most loyal to the regime. Many of these soldiers and intelligence agents have killed Iraqi citizens for Saddam. 75 They are unlikely to revolt, for they fear revenge and prosecution at the hands of their fellow citizens.
Finally, if the population did revolt, it will be extremely difficult for them to win against health care to his most loyal forces. Those who benefited from the disproportional distribution will gain in relative strength vs. the rest of the population during a siege. The longer the siege goes on, the more difficult it will be for the Iraqi people to revolt. Therefore, U.S. control of infrastructure, combined with information operations, will probably not make the Iraqi people overthrow their ruler or cause Iraqi forces to surrender. The U.S. will not be able to control infrastructure and services, but rather, will simply be able to deny them. That denial will have the main effect of making the majority of the population of Baghdad more destitute relative to Baghdad's elite. In turn, the destruction of the infrastructure will bolster Saddam Hussein's information operations while weakening the strength of the U.S. forces' message. If the population were to revolt, it is unlikely to succeed, due to the strength of the opposition, and the relative weakness of the majority of the population due to the siege. Consequently, because the Indirect Approach relies on a popular revolt to topple the regime, the method appears to leave decisive action to others.
Refugees
Although the population is unlikely to revolt, it is likely that a large part of the population will leave the city. The Indirect Approach calls for encouraging refugees to leave the city for camps or to go to a safe area of the city where they can get humanitarian aid. In the case of Baghdad, establishing a safe haven in the city would certainly require U.S. forces to secure the area. That would involve clearing any portion of the city from which direct or indirect fire could attack the safe haven. U.S. forces could only accomplish that by clearing a major portion of the city. The Indirect Approach seeks to avoid that task. Therefore, the refugees would have to leave Baghdad.
Any U.S. military operation in Iraq will cause the migration of refugees from one place to another. Some of these refugees will seek asylum in neighboring countries, others will become internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Iraq. Depending on the admissions policy of the country in which they seek refuge, asylum seekers may end up pinned on the Iraq side of the border. Initial estimates of the UN indicate that there will be between 566,000 to 1,400,000 asylum seekers, in addition to 2,000,000 internally displaced persons. 76 The total maximum estimate of 3.4 million refugees is a considerable portion of the 25.5 million 77 people estimated to populate Iraq in October 2002. Nevertheless, if coalition forces use the Indirect Approach, these numbers will almost double.
The result of the Indirect Approach will be a far greater number of refugees fleeing the Baghdad area. This is because U.S. forces will actively encourage the population of the city to 80 It is not clear from the source document how many of the asylum seekers in the UN estimates will originate from the Baghdad area. This monograph arrives at an estimate of the figure using the following analysis: Baghdad makes up approximately 20% of the Iraqi population. 20% of the 1.4 million asylum seekers is 280,000. Since 1.4 million is the high end of the range of asylum seekers (566,000 to 1,400,000), 280,000 is probably a liberal estimate of the portion of asylum seekers that the UN thought would come from Baghdad. assuming "Humanitarian organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, will be the Iraqi regime, as the Indirect Approach suggests. 84 The burden is on the United States. After taking away food and clean water from the residents of Baghdad, it will be difficult to sell the international community and the media on the idea that the suffering of Baghdad's residents is the International political pressure to end the siege will increase significantly due to humanitarian considerations. "High levels of civilian casualties, or the perceptio n of civilian casualties, could lead to an international diplomatic outcry to end the war prematurely." 88 Pressure will begin almost immediately with the siege operation. The plight of the refugees and the city's inhabitants will focus world attention. The consequences of the humanitarian crisis will erode the legitimacy of the United States' case for a war, and affect the support that other nations give the coalition. Thus, the humanitarian crisis will hurt the U.S. case for the war, divert vital military resources, and possibly force a premature end to the siege. Granted, virtually any military action in Iraq will create refugee movements and temporarily interrupt the shipment of vital resources to the citizens of Iraq. However, U.S. forces must be careful to choose a course of action that minimizes the impact, rather than one that intentionally increases the impact.
Time
The key idea in the Indirect Approach is that time is on the side of the U.S. However, this case study shows that time is not on the side of U.S. forces besieging Baghdad. Instead, the passage of time will actually favor Saddam Hussein. Saddam's first goal is to remain in power.
The longer the conflict drags on, the greater the chance that Saddam will be able to do that.
Three major factors will increase Saddam's chances of remaining in power as the conflict drags on. These factors directly correlate with the three critical vulnerabilities that Iraq is trying to exploit: The cohesiveness of the coalition, international public opinion, and U.S. domestic public opinion.
The first factor is the effect that the conflict will have on other governments in the Middle East. "Saddam realizes that a U.S. attack would put many Arab regimes under serious strain as it would inevitably result in massive and destabilizing anti-U.S. demonstrations across the 88 Ibid, 1.
region." 89 The longer the conflict goes on, the more it will stir up resentment, possibly causing the U.S. to lose the support of vital bases and resources in the region.
The second factor is domestic public opinion in the U.S. As the conflict in Iraq goes on, debate over the conduct and necessity of the war will continue in the U.S. Should the conflict continue long enough, the results of U.S. elections may reflect the level of support for the war.
The third factor is international pressure to end the conflict. The Indirect Approach seeks to achieve the first objective, to end the power of the old regime, through an overthrow of the government by the people or through a surrender of the old regime. The U.S. will attempt to cause the overthrow or surrender with a siege and precision targeting. The approach proposes to allow time to pass until the method works. This approach allows no means to determine if the method has failed. If there is no surrender or revolution, then perhaps U.S. forces simply need more time. Conceivably, the U.S. may not reach the first military objective, and instead, a stalemate will occur.
The second objective is the creation of a new regime to control Iraq. In Baghdad, the new regime will need to provide the people with a working infrastructure and dependable public services. Those actions will help the government to convince the people that it is legitimate.
Unfortunately, the Indirect Approach works against this end state by deliberately targeting infrastructure and public services. 95 Ibid.
On numerous occasions, we attacked and destroyed physical infrastructure elements within the area of influence in order to exert pressure on the opponent and his interests. Such infrastructure elements included bridges, transportation, power stations, etc. In the short term, this course of action may have been beneficial. In the long run, however, its benefits are doubtful, as the purpose of our intervention was to make peace and restore stability-and it is very difficult to accomplish this in a country or an area whose infrastructure we have destroyed. 96 The same issues that applied to the Israelis in Lebanon will apply to the U.S. in Iraq. Steve Hadley, the U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor, wrote recently that after the conflict "Early efforts will include restoring electricity and clean water…"
97 Deliberate destruction of infrastructure may be necessary for certain military operations. However, when planning the campaign with a view of the end state in mind, it is clear that targeting infrastructure should be a last resort.
The third objective requires the U.S. to destroy Iraq's WMD and WMD program. The Indirect Approach suggests striking these targets with precision weapons. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, it is relatively easy to hide weapons in an urban area. It is also difficult for ISR assets to find them. Because the Indirect Approach does not call for U.S. forces to be on the ground in the city, a good accounting and destruction of WMD cannot take place until after the city falls. This will leave U.S. forces and the Iraqi population more vulnerable to WMD during the siege.
The ultimate objective that extends beyond Iraq is the transfer of loyalty and support by the people to the new regime. If the U.S. implements a siege, it will not just be fighting the regime of Iraq, but the people of Iraq. As Tamari wrote when reflecting on the lessons learned from Israel's campaign in Lebanon, "It is important that we distinguis h the opponent-be it the regime, the military leadership, or the military forces-from the civilian population." 98 This distinction proved important to the Israelis because they lost a lot of ground in winning the peace when they deferred taking care of the civilian population until after they had finished fighting the armed forces. "The damage we caused by our military operation was very difficult to repair or make up for during the next phase." 99 The United States will run into the same problem if it conducts a siege of Baghdad in which the Iraqi civilian population suffers immensely. The people will be unlikely to take a favorable view of the U.S. or of the government that the U.S.
installs.
Therefore, The Indirect Approach fails to fit in well with the end state that the U.S.
desires. There is no decisive operation to ensure that the old regime will fall. Destruction of the infrastructure will make it difficult for a new government to gain control of Baghdad. U.S. forces cannot bring all of their power to bear against weapons of mass destruction until after the city falls. Two of the keys to successfully installing a stable, peaceful regime that shares U.S.
interests is winning over the population and preserving the infrastructure. Scales' approach works against achieving both of those key factors.
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There are several practical reasons why the Indirect Approach will fail. First, time is not on the side of the U.S. if it lays siege to Baghdad. International media will cover the suffering among Baghdad's population. That coverage will create international and domestic political pressure to lift the siege. The U.S. might then have to lift the siege prematurely, before regime change takes place. Ibid, 51. Second, U.S. control of infrastructure and information operations will neither lead the Iraqi people to overthrow their ruler, nor will it cause Iraqi forces to surrender. The U.S. will not be able to control Baghdad's infrastructure and public services to the degree that Scales suggests.
Instead, military action will simply create outages of varying duration. The Iraqi people who can most easily lead a coup are members of the Baath Party and in the security forces close to Saddam. These same people will be the least effected by service outages. Saddam will continue to siphon resources from the rest of Baghdad's population to take care of these elites. Thus, U.S. military control of services cannot influence the Iraqi elite to lead a coup. Because the larger Iraqi population is dependent on the regime, they will probably not be able to gain the access needed to topple Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein has ruled by murdering or imprisoning any who show opposition or disloyalty to his regime. These conditions do not support the organization of revolution among his citizens. Even if the Iraqi people did attempt to dislodge the Baath Party from power, it is even less probable that they would succeed. Instead, Iraqi citizens are likely to suffer under Saddam's leadership until outside forces remove him from power.
A phenomenal humanitarian crisis will result from MG Scales' proposal. A city is a life support system for the population within it. The siege will cut off the life support, and, if the Iraqi regime allows it, the majority of the population in Baghdad will flee. The Indirect Approach calls for U.S. forces to encourage the population to leave the city. 100 The U.S. will then have to find a way to care for millions of Iraqi civilians. A further problem is that the very people who are unable to flee the city, such as the elderly, mobility-impaired, and the hospitalized, are most in need of special care. The refugee problem will distract U.S. forces from their primary mission and cause further domestic and international political pressure to end the siege. ISR assets will not be able to find all of the enemy targets in the city. It is easy to conceal weapons and WMD in urban areas. Enemy leaders and soldiers can blend in with the civilian population. Weather will prevent ISR assets from being able to conduct continuous surveillance.
As a result, precision fires will not be able to find and strike all of the necessary targets.
Using precision fires, without at least the accompanying threat of direct force on the ground, has the effect of creating sanctuaries for Saddam Hussein and his forces. Iraqi intelligence organizations can easily assess what targets the U.S. will and will not strike. Iraqi forces and leadership can take refuge in residential areas, hospitals, and mosques. U.S. forces may only be able to clear those sanctuaries by going in on the ground.
The Indirect Approach does not contribute towards the U.S.'s desired end state and objectives. The Iraqi regime may be able to withstand the siege over time, in which case a stalemate will occur. Without using forces on the ground and human intelligence inside the city, U.S. forces may not be able to find and eliminate WMD early enough in the operation to prevent their use. The extraordinary physical and psychological effects of the siege are not compatible to U.S. goals of liberating the Iraqi people and installing a regime that does not pose a threat to the U.S. Instead, a harsh siege will brew hatred among the Iraqi people and among the rest of the Arab world.
In his paper on the Indirect Approach, Scales suggested that the concept might not work in every situation. He states that the nature of the population and the city are some of the key considerations that planners should examine. After reviewing those considerations, it is clear that the Indirect Approach is not feasible in Baghdad. The U.S. must take a direct approach to reach the U.S. end state and military objectives.
The U.S. should consider the following items when engaging in urban operations that have similar conditions as those that stood between the U.S. and Iraq in mid-March 2003:
1. Isolate the city, as Scales suggests.
2. Utilize ground forces and allow them to engage in combat in the city. Ground forces, in conjunction with the other components of the joint force, should focus on Iraq's critical vulnerabilities: The ability of Hussein and his inner circle to avoid death or capture; the control
